Abstract It is argued that the notion of classical entailment faces two problems, the second argument projection problem and the P -to-Q problem, which arise because classical entailment is not designed to handle partial functions. It is shown that while the second argument projection problem can be solved either by flattening the syntactic tree or with naïve multi-valued logics, the P -to-Q problem cannot. Both problems are solved by introducing a new notion of entailment that is defined in terms of Strawson entailment (in the sense of von Fintel 1999 Fintel , 2001 ).
alternative that is inspired by the notion of Strawson entailment (as it is understood and used in von Fintel 1999 Fintel , 2001 .
One of the goals of semantic theory is to explain speakers' intuitions regarding relations between sentences. An example of such a linguistic intuition is the one regarding (1), which is reflected by speakers' discomfort with It's true that some student arrived early but it isn't true that some student arrived (or [(1a) but not (1b)]).
(1) a. Some student arrived early. b. Some student arrived.
A widely held view is that the relation between (1a) and (1b) is that of classical entailment -or ⇒-entailment -defined informally in (2) (where a statement is something that has a truth value, a predicate is something that takes arguments to yield a truth value, and a type-relevant x is an x of the type that can serve as an argument of P and of Q).
(2)
⇒-entailment (classical entailment) a. For any statements p and q, p ⇒-entails q iff p is false or q is true.
b. For any predicates P and Q, P ⇒-entails Q iff for all type-relevant x, P (x) ⇒-entails Q(x).
Assume that arrive and arrive early have no presuppositions. It follows from clause (2b) that arrive early ⇒-entails arrive, because for any type-relevant x, it follows from clause (2a) that [x arrived early] ⇒-entails [x arrived] . By similar reasoning, (1a) ⇒-entails (1b).
The pair in (1) also illustrates the fact that the determiner some is upwardentailing with respect to its second argument. An informal definition of upward-entailingness is given in (3).
(3)
O is upward-entailing iff for all type-relevant P and Q such that P
⇒-entails Q, O(P ) ⇒-entails O(Q).
Indeed, for any type-relevant X (e.g., student), and any type-relevant P and Q such that P ⇒-entails Q, [O P ] is false or [O Q] is true, where O = some X.
However, on the view that presuppositions are encoded semantically, two problems arise with (2)-(3) when we consider cases where some takes presuppositional arguments such as likes his mother. The examples in (4)- (5) 1:2 A note on (Strawson) entailment illustrate the second argument projection problem and the example in (6) illustrates the P -to-Q problem. (4) a. Some French student arrived. b. Some student arrived.
(5) a. Some French student likes his mother. b. Some student likes his mother.
(6) a. Some student likes his mother. b. Some student likes someone.
The second argument projection problem. Assume that French student and student have no presuppositions. By (2), French student ⇒-entails student and (4a) ⇒-entails (4b), but (5a) does not ⇒-entail (5b), despite the fact that speakers reject [(5a) but not (5b)] just as they reject [(4a) but not (4b)]. The reason is, presumably, that when all the students are motherless, both (5a) and (5b) are neither true nor false. Accordingly, while (3) makes some upward-entailing with respect to its second argument (as we saw), it does not make it upward-entailing with respect to its first argument: it is impossible to establish that Some P likes his mother ⇒-entails Some Q likes his mother for every typerelevant P and Q such that P ⇒-entails Q. Consequently, we fail to capture the fact that speakers have the same reaction to [(4a) but not (4b)] and [(5a) but not (5b)].
The P-to-Q problem. Speakers reject [(6a) but not (6b)] just as they reject [(1a) but not (1b)]. We want to blame this on the fact that some is upward-entailing, by (3), with respect to its second argument. In other words, we want to be able to say that just like (1a) ⇒-entails (1b) because arrive early ⇒-entails arrive, (6a) ⇒-entails if x is motherless and doesn't like anyone, x likes his mother is neither true nor false and x likes someone is false.
To solve these problems, we introduce two new relations:
st ⇒-entailment, informally defined in (7), and ⇛-entailment, informally defined in ( Yael Sharvit tribute to Strawson (1952) ). The notion of ⇛-entailment is defined in terms of Strawson entailment. We also propose that the definition of upwardentailingness in (3) be replaced with (9). 
⇒-entails Q(x).
(8)
⇛-entailment
For any P and Q, P ⇛-entails Q iff a. P st ⇒-entails Q; and b. if P and Q are predicates, for all n ≥ 1 and all ⟨x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ⟩, if P (⟨x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ⟩) is a truth value, satisfaction of the presuppositions of P (⟨x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ⟩) guarantees satisfaction of the presuppositions of Q(⟨x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ⟩).
(9)
O is upward-entailing iff for all type-relevant P and Q such that P ⇛-entails Q and the presuppositions of O(P ) are satisfied, the presuppositions of O(Q) are satisfied and O(P ) ⇛-entails O(Q).
Both problems are solved. When x has a mother, x likes his mother is false or x likes someone is true. Consequently, likes his mother ⇛-entails likes someone.
When some French student has a mother, some student has a mother, and (5a) is false or (5b) is true. When some student has a mother, (6a) is false or (6b) is true. Consequently, some comes out upward-entailing with respect to its first and second arguments. We contend that on the view that presuppositions are semantically encoded, the significant forms of entailment in natural language are st ⇒-entailment and ⇛-entailment. Classical entailment -namely, ⇒-entailment as defined in (2) -plays a very small role in semantics.
In Section 2 we discuss the second argument projection problem and the P -to-Q problem in some detail. In Section 3 we introduce and revise the notion of Strawson upward-and downward-entailingness in order to solve the second argument projection problem. In Section 4 we build on the proposal in Section 3 to solve the P -to-Q problem. Section 5 compares our proposal to a proposal that is based on a trivalent logic and a proposal that is based on a flattened clause structure.
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The basics
In what follows, when we say that sentence A intuitively entails sentence B, we mean that whenever speakers judge A true, they automatically judge B true. For example, Mary and Jane arrived intuitively entails Mary arrived. When we say that one-place predicate α intuitively entails one-place predicate β, we mean that for any type-appropriate x, [x (is) α] intuitively entails [x (is) β]. For example, arrived early intuitively entails arrived and French student intuitively entails student. When we say that a determiner DET is intuitively upward-entailing on its first argument, we mean that for any typeappropriate α, β and γ such that α entails β, [DET α γ] intuitively entails [DET β γ] . When we say that DET is intuitively downward-entailing on its first argument, we mean that for any type-appropriate α, β and γ such that α entails β, [DET β γ] intuitively entails [DET α γ] . Similar conventions apply to "DET is upward/downward-entailing on its second argument". For example, the determiner no is intuitively downward-entailing on its first and second arguments, as evidenced by the fact that No student arrived intuitively entails both No French student arrived and No student arrived early. The determiner some is intuitively upward-entailing on its first and second arguments, as evidenced by the fact that Some French student arrived and Some student arrived early each intuitively entails Some student arrived.
A widely held view is that intuitive entailment is modeled on '⇒' (roughly, ⇒-entailment in Section 1), which is defined recursively in (10) (see, for example, von Fintel 1999). Intuitive upward-and downward-entailingness are modeled on UE and DE defined in (11) and (12) respectively.
(10) We are only concerned here with the types of determiners and their arguments. 
For any w and C, and any
[no student] arrived and w ("no is DE on its second argument"). The determiner some, with the meaning in (15), comes out UE on its second argument (see (II), Appendix). It also comes out UE on its first argument, as expected.
Why is it important to classify no as downward-entailing and some as upward-entailing in a purely technical sense? It is often claimed that formal properties such as DE and UE are linguistically significant in the sense that certain linguistic rules explicitly refer to them (see, for example, Heim & Kratzer 1998, Chapter 6 and references cited there). For the sake of the discussion, we take it for granted that the following holds. There are linguistic rules that refer to DE functions and linguistic rules that refer to UE functions. Since no behaves as if it is referred to by the former and some behaves as if it is referred to by the latter, we expect no to come out DE and some UE.
As is well known, however, it is not obvious that the functions in (13) and (15) are indeed the meanings of no and some, because these determiners seem to carry presuppositions.
Presuppositional arguments
The sentence John likes his first book, with the definite description his first book, is judged odd when John doesn't have a first book (for discussion of related experimental evidence see, for example, Abrusán & Szendrői 2013 (18), rather than the total function in (13). likes his first book C,w (x) is defined iff the cardinality of {y ∈ C(w) y is a book of x in w and no z ∈ {z ′ ∈ C(w) z ′ is a book of x in w} precedes y (relative to x) in w} is 1; b. if defined, likes his first book C,w (x) = True iff for all y ′ ∈ {y ∈ C(w) y is a book of x in w and no z ∈ {z ′ ∈ D e z ′ is a book of x in w} precedes y (relative to x) in w}, x likes y ′ in w. 
if likes his first book is as in (17), then likes C,w , of C,w , first C,w and book C,w are total, and
. the cardinality of {y ∈ C(w) P (y) = True} is 1, and for all z ∈ {y ∈ C(w) P (y) = True}, Q(z) = True.
(ii)
Predicate Abstraction: If α is a branching node and {n, γ} is the set of its daughters (where n is a numerical index), then for any w, C and assignment g, α C,w,g = λx∶ γ C,w,g[n→x] is defined. γ C,w,g[n→x] .
(iii) Traces and Pronouns Rule: If α is a pronoun or a trace and n a numerical index, then for any w, C and assignment g, α n C,w,g is defined only if n is in the domain of g.
When defined, α n C,w,g = g(n).
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A note on (Strawson) entailment (17) For any C, w and x ∈ D e , likes his first book C,w (x) = True iff the cardinality of {y ∈ C(w) y is a book of x in w and no z ∈ {z ′ ∈ C(w) z ′ is a book of x in w} precedes y (relative to x) in w} is 1, and for all y ′ ∈ {y ∈ C(w) y is a book of x in w and no z ∈ {z ′ ∈ C(w) z ′ is a book of x in w} precedes y (relative to x) in w}, x likes y ′ in w. no
Let us call the first presupposition of no ((a) in (18)) the first argument presupposition, and the second presupposition of no ((b) in (18)) the second argument presupposition. Presumably, all determiners have a first and a second argument presupposition, though there is some controversy regarding their exact formulation. Some scholars (e.g., Heim (1983) ) argue that the second argument presupposition is always the universal {y ∈ C(w) Z(y) = True} ⊆ Dom(Y ) in (18b). Other scholars (e.g., Beaver (2001) ) have proposed an existential version of the second argument presupposition (at least for some determiners), namely, {y ∈ C(w) Z(y) = True} ∩ Dom(Y ) ≠ ∅. In addition, at least for some determiners, the first argument presupposition has been argued to be the strong {y ∈ C(w) Z(y) = True} ≠ ∅ rather than the weak (18a).
4 Nothing we say in this section and in Section 3 hinges on which versions are adopted, and we assume different versions for different determiners. For example, we assume some has an existential second argument presupposition, though the reason for this will become apparent only in Section 4, where we consider a variation in predictions arising from the different versions of these presuppositions.
As it turns out, '⇒', as defined in (10a) -repeated below -is not explicit about the status of partial functions.
This is problematic because by (10a), for any σ and f ∈ D ⟨σ ,t⟩ such that Dom(f ) ⊂ D σ , there is at least one x ∈ D σ such that we cannot determine that f (x) = True, nor can we determine that f (x) ≠ True (i.e., that f (x) = False). We cannot determine that f (x) = Undefined either, as Undefined is not a member of D t in this system: by (10b), D t = {True, False}. Rather, f (x) is undefined. Therefore, for any σ , any f , g ∈ D ⟨σ ,t⟩ , and any x ∈ D σ such that
we cannot determine by (10a) either that f ⇒ g or that f ⇏ g. As a result, the following two problems arise: the second argument projection problem, illustrated by (19a) and (19b), and the P -to-Q problem, illustrated by (19c) and (19d No determiner that has a second argument presupposition -"existential" or "universal" -comes out either DE or UE on its first argument. For example, according to (18), we cannot establish that for any C and w and any P and Q 1:10
To see why, assume as before that French professor
it follows from the definition of '⇒' that Dom( French professor
given that we are now allowing partial functions, the domains of these functions could, in principle, be smaller; we come back to this issue in Section 4.1). But there is at least one C and w such that C(w) has French and non-French professors, but none of them has in w a first book in C(w), so no
Therefore, we cannot establish that no
(We also cannot establish that for some C, w, P and
Similarly, within the semantic approach to presuppositions, (20) -and not (15) some
c. when defined, some
Because of its second argument presupposition, some is not UE on its first argument.
As we saw in Section 2.1, no and some do come out DE and UE respectively on their first argument if we assume that they are total (and that likes his first book is total). If we don't want to give up on partiality completely, we may try to avoid the second argument projection problem by giving up only the second argument presupposition. Suppose we say that No professor likes his first book is (at least optionally) interpreted as 'No professor who has a first book likes his first book', via the local accommodation of the presupposition of likes his first book into the first argument position of no (along the lines of Berman 1991). As argued in von Fintel 2008, this is not a viable option, for the following reason (see also Beaver 2004) . If local presupposition accommodation were an available process in the grammar, a locally 1:11 accommodated presupposition would not be perceived as a presupposition at all, but rather as an embedded assertion. For example, (21a) and (21b) would both be acceptable. In point of fact, only (21a) is; (21b) sounds contradictory. (21) a. No student who has a mother wrote to his mother, yet the students who don't have a mother wished they had a mother to write to. b. #No student wrote to his mother, yet the students who don't have a mother wished they had a mother to write to.
So if no and some are indeed partial, they have a second argument presupposition (as in (18) and (20)), which prevents them from being DE/UE on their first argument.
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Note that neither the first argument presupposition nor the second argument presupposition prevents any determiner from being DE or UE on its second argument. For example, when we check whether no is DE on its second argument -that is, when we check whether no
-by the definition of "DE" we only consider combinations of no and Z such that no C,w (Z) is a function (i.e., is defined; so the presuppositions of Z, whatever they are, are satisfied), and only pairs ⟨P , Q⟩ such that P ⇒ Q (whose domains, by the definition of '⇒', are D e ). This implies that when we say that no is DE on its second argument, we mean that for any Z, C and w such that no C,w (Z) is defined, no C,w (Z) is DE; when we say that some is UE on its second argument, we mean that for any Z, C and w such that some
On to the P -to-Q problem. Notice that we cannot prove that the informal statement in (22) is valid. Yet it seems reasonable to take its validity for granted, given intuitions regarding some. On the additional (reasonable) assumption that "intuitively entails" is modeled on some well-defined notion of formal entailment, we expect (23) to be a (provably) valid statement. (23) For any type-appropriate α and β: (a) iff (b).
a. For any Z ∈ D ⟨e,t⟩ , C and w such that some
formally entails some
b. For any C and w, α C,w formally entails β C,w .
A natural candidate for "formally entails" is '⇒', so let us replace all occurrences of "formally entails" in (23) with '⇒'. We get (24), which is valid on the assumption that all natural language functions are total.
(24) For and type-appropriate α and β: (a) iff (b).
For advocates of the semantic approach to presuppositions, this implies that "formally entails" in (23) is not '⇒'. Given the (assumed) validity of (22), we have to come up with an alternative definition of "formally entails" that would make (23) a valid statement. Note that advocates of a purely pragmatic approach to presuppositions will probably consider these problems to be support for the pragmatic approach. After all, the second argument projection problem and the P -to-Q problem are byproducts of the assumption that the only way to account for the emergence of presuppositions is by treating natural language functions as potentially partial. We do not take issue with this position. Indeed, solving the second argument projection problem and the P -to-Q problem is the burden of advocates of the semantic approach. Of course, advocates of the pragmatic approach have to provide an alternative explanation for the emergence of presuppositions; this is a nontrivial task which we do not discuss any further.
In Section 3 we explore a semantic solution to the second argument projection problem that is based on Strawson entailment -formally, '
(roughly, st ⇒-entailment in Section 1) -which is weaker than '⇒'. Accordingly, no and some come out formally Strawson downward-and upward-entailing, respectively, on their first argument. In Section 4 we solve the P -to-Q problem by modeling intuitive entailment on '⇛' (roughly, ⇛-entailment in Section 1), which is defined in terms of ' st ⇒' and is stronger than ' st ⇒'. As we show, (23) is valid when "formally entails" is replaced with '⇛'. One might wonder whether exploiting a trivalent logic, or a flattened LF, would offer other -perhaps simpler -semantic solutions to both these problems. In Section 5 we explore and reject two such alternatives. Fauconnier (1978) and Ladusaw (1979) , says that they are licensed in the scope of functions that are DE, such as sentential negation. (Given the definition of "DE" assumed here, the condition should be: An NPI is licensed in the scope of an α such that α C,w is DE for any C and w.) As is also well known (at least since Ladusaw 1979), there are expressions that license weak NPIs but are not even intuitively downward-entailing. Only is a typical example: Only John has ever visited Paris is grammatical, yet (25a) may be judged true when John arrived late. Rather, (25a) intuitively . We say "(25a) intuitively Strawson-entails (25b)" to mean that the truth of (25a) and the presupposition of (25b) -John arrived early -intuitively guarantee the truth of (25b). More generally, whenever we say "Sentence A intuitively Strawson-entails sentence B", we mean that whenever A and the presuppositions of B are judged true, B is judged true. A similar behavior is exhibited by sorry and longest.
10
Given intuitions regarding only and similar NPI-licensers, the suggestion in von Fintel 1999 Fintel , 2001 is that weak NPIs are licensed in the scope of functions that are Strawson DE -or SDE -as defined in (26). The term "SUE", the "upward" counterpart of "SDE", is defined in (27) . (26) A function f ∈ D ⟨σ ,τ⟩ is SDE iff for any P , Q ∈ D σ such that P ⇒ Q and f (P ) and f (Q) are defined: f (Q) ⇒ f (P ). a. only
b. when only
is defined and Z(x) = True; and c. when defined, only
When defined,
We say that only is SDE on its second argument because for any C and w,
and any x ∈ D e such that only C,w (x) is defined, only C,w (x) is, by (26), SDE (see (V), Appendix). For example, for any C and w, it follows from the (nontrivial) assumption that arrived early
and it follows from (28) that when only
In general, any DE function is also SDE, but the reverse does not hold; likewise, any function that is UE is also SUE, but the reverse does not hold.
12
on the point made here, and we may ignore it. Also, the new condition on NPI licensing is: An NPI is licensed in the scope of an α such that α C,w is SDE for any C and w. 
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A note on (Strawson) entailment Thus, Strawson upward/downward-entailingness provides us with a way to model properties of partial functions, and it seems promising to try to solve the second argument projection problem by appealing to it. The idea would be to say that no and some, as the partial functions in (18) and (20), are merely SDE and SUE respectively on their first argument (though they are DE and UE respectively on their second argument, as we saw in Section 2.2).
Some readers may be uncomfortable with this move, for the following reason. It relies on speakers' intuitions about Strawson entailment (e.g., on the claim that No professor likes his first book intuitively Strawson- 
entails No French professor likes his first book).
To test such intuitions, we present speakers with a task that seems very strange; we ask them to decide whether the truth of A plus the presuppositions of B guarantees the truth of B. In their everyday life, speakers often ask themselves whether B follows from A, but rarely (probably never) whether B follows from "A plus the presuppositions of B". But notice that what we actually ask speakers to decide is whether the truth of "A and P " guarantees the truth of B, where P is the conjunction of the presuppositions of B which we explicitly spell out for them. What precisely the presuppositions of B are is determined independently. Granted, determining what a sentence presupposes is often subject to considerable theoretical debate, but that is an independent issue. Crucially, the task of figuring out whether B follows from "A and P " is no different from the task of figuring out whether B follows from A.
And indeed, No French professor likes his first book follows from No professor likes his first book and any and all French professors have a first book, just like Only John left early follows from Only John left and John left early.
As we now show, the second argument presupposition prevents no and some from being SDE/SUE on their first argument, just like it prevents them from being DE/UE on their first argument. Fortunately, replacing SDE/SUE with a different notion of Strawson downward/upward-entailingness solves the problem.
Because of the second argument presupposition in (18), for any C and w with French and non-French professors in C(w) that have in w no first book in C(w), both no the semantics in (31), with a "universal" second argument presupposition, and a "strong" first argument presupposition.
For any w and C, and any Z, Y ∈ D ⟨e,t⟩ :
a. every
For any w and C, it follows from the assumption that arrived early
fore, as long as there are students in C(w) (or in other words, as long as every
Thus, every is indeed UE on its second argument (see (VI), Appendix). But when, for some C and w, there are French and non-French students in C(w) are both undefined, and "Every is SDE on its first argument" cannot be established (even if we weaken the first argument presupposition of every). Fortunately, a slightly different notion of Strawson downward/upwardentailingness does solve the second argument projection problem. Specifically, we propose SDE ST and SUE ST , in (32) and (33) respectively, as alternatives to SDE in (26) and SUE in (27). Here, P and Q are constrained by '⇒' (as in (26) and (27)), but a new relation -'
is the Strawsonian counterpart of '⇒' defined in (34) (see Herdan & Sharvit 2006 and Gajewski 2007) . holds vacuously, this is not the case for all w and C (specifically, those w and C where someone in C(w) has a mother and a father). Notice that we could alternatively define ' st ⇒' so that it is undefined for pairs ⟨f , g⟩ with nonintersecting domains. For current purposes, the differences between such a definition and (34) are insignificant.
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The second argument projection problem is thus solved. For example, no, as defined in (18), comes out SDE ST on its first argument (see (VII), Appendix).
By (34), for any C, w and f such that
it is the case that
If some professors in C(w) lack a first book, likes his first book C,w is ignored because it is not in
By similar reasoning, some comes out SUE ST This solution to the second argument projection problem is somewhat disappointing. For example, it makes some SUE ST on its first argument, but it is intuitively upward-entailing, and not merely intuitively Strawson upwardentailing, on its first argument. As we will now see, the solution to the P-to-Q problem also solves the second argument projection problem in a more satisfactory manner.
Solving the P-to-Q problem with Strawson entailment
The scope of the problem
Before offering a solution to the P -to-Q problem, let us remind ourselves of what it is and expand its scope a bit. Given our intuitions about some, we expect (23), repeated below, to be valid.
(23) For any type-appropriate α and β: (a) iff (b). formally entails some
As we saw in Section 2.2, the problem is that "formally entails" cannot mean '⇒', within the semantic approach to presuppositions, because of pairs such as ⟨likes his first book, likes something⟩.
There are other generalizations that show that "formally entails" is not '⇒'; one of them also shows that the solution in Section 3 to the second argument projection problem is not satisfactory as far as some is concerned. Recall that our definitions make some merely SUE ST (23) a. For any C and w such that some
On the other hand, given that for many speakers Every student who likes someone arrived merely intuitively Strawson-entails Every student who likes his mother arrived, there is no problem with classifying every as merely formally Strawson downward-entailing. However, given that (36a) merely intuitively Strawson-entails (36b) (it is possible that all the students are not book-destroyers, yet none of them has a unique first book), no should come out formally Strawson downward-entailing on its second argument and not DE, as it is classified now, just as it comes out formally Strawson downward-entailing on its first argument.
(36) a. No student destroyed a book. b. No student destroyed his first book.
It is also important to acknowledge that the P -to-Q problem is not confined to pairs such as ⟨likes his first book, likes something⟩. So far we have
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Yael Sharvit assumed, for convenience, that for any C and w, French student C,w ⇒ student C,w . But in fact, these functions, too, may be partial; that is to say, even innocent-looking predicates such as student may carry nontrivial presuppositions (see Magidor 2013). For example, there might be individuals, such as the chair I'm sitting on, that cannot, in principle, be students in at least one possible world. We find ourselves, then, in a rather strange meta-theoretical situation. We can easily formally prove that no is DE and some UE on their second arguments (see (III)-(IV), Appendix), but if all worlddependent predicates are potentially partial, no world-dependent pair of predicates can actually illustrate these properties of some and no. For example, on the assumption that John, be and self-identical are rigid designators, be John
C,w (for all C and w); and indeed Some student is John intuitively entails Some student is self-identical. However, Some boy is a French student intuitively entails Some boy is a student, yet we cannot establish that French student C,w ⇒ student C,w (for all C and w).
The solution
4.2.1
Step 1: Constraining P and Q with ⇛
We introduce '⇛' as a new formal notion of intuitive entailment, to replace all occurrences of '⇒' in the definitions of (Strawson) upward-and downward-entailingness. Informally, f ⇛ g iff (i) f Strawson-entails g, and
(ii) satisfaction of the presuppositions of f guarantees the satisfaction of the presuppositions of g. More formally, we define '⇛' as in (37).
(37)
,
An example of a pair of predicates that satisfies '⇛' in all C and w is ⟨likes his first book, likes something⟩. This is because for any C and w, (38), where P and Q are constrained by '⇛', and the relation between f (P ) and f (Q) is also '⇛'. They are the new formal notions of downward-and upward-entailingness.
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Yael Sharvit (38) Downward/upward-entailingness
For example, some is UE ⇛ on its second argument, as illustrated by the fact that for any C and w, likes his mother Strawson-entails it) : it is possible that all the students are not book-destroyers, yet none of them has a (unique) first book. Likewise, only is not DE ⇛ on its second argument, and every is not DE ⇛ on its first argument.
We also define SDE and SUE as in (39a) 
Being UE ⇛ , some is also SUE ⇛ on both its arguments. Only is merely SDE ⇛ on its second argument, no is merely SDE ⇛ on both its arguments and every is merely SDE ⇛ on its first argument and SUE ⇛ on its second. Some of the results are summarized in (40). 
The answer to the first question is not obvious, and the answer to the second question is clearly "no". To see this, let us discuss some concrete cases.
If every is SDE st ⇒ on its first argument, we expect (43a) to intuitively Strawson entail (43b) . (43) a. Every student who stabbed all of his younger siblings went to jail. b. Every student who stabbed all of his siblings went to jail. 
Suppose, then, that there are students who stabbed all of their younger siblings and students who stabbed all of their siblings, and that they all can, in principle, go to jail. In such a state of affairs, (43a) does not intuitively : when some student has only older siblings, and he stabbed them all and didn't go to jail, (43b) is intuitively false, but (43a) may be intuitively true. This implies that every is not SDE st ⇒ on its first argument, but merely SDE ⇛ . Notice, though, that if every had a super-strong first argument presupposition -namely, {y ∈ C(w) Z(y) = True} ≠ ∅ and C(w) ⊆ Dom(Z) -then (43a) would intuitively . We would expect speakers who have such a semantics for every to find both (44) and (45) incoherent.
(44)
Every prisoner who had stabbed all of his siblings was denied an early hearing. Prisoner John never had any siblings and got an early hearing.
(45) Every prisoner who was denied an early hearing had stabbed all of his siblings. Prisoner John appealed the denial of his early hearing because he never had any siblings.
In an informal survey we conducted of fifteen speakers, all participants found (45) to be incoherent, but only two found (44) to be incoherent. This suggests the following:
i. For those speakers who found (44) incoherent, every might have a super-strong first argument presupposition, requiring John to have had at least one sibling at some point.
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ii. For those speakers who found (44) coherent, every seems not to have a super-strong first argument presupposition -so John need not have had any siblings ever.
iii. No speaker excluded John from C(w); for if they had, they would have found both (44) and (45) , and if some is SUE st ⇒ on its second argument, we expect (47a) to intuitively . (46) a. Every student stabbed all of his siblings. b. Every student stabbed all of his younger siblings.
(47) a. Some student stabbed all of her siblings. b. Some student stabbed all of her younger siblings.
When all the students stabbed all their siblings, but not all students have younger siblings, not all students are younger-sibling-stabbers; this means that (46a) intuitively only if every indeed has a "universal" second argument presupposition, as in (31). As mentioned in Section 3, there is no agreement among scholars about the quantificational force of the second argument presupposition. It has been suggested (see Chemla 2009 ) that the quantificational force of the second argument presupposition is predictable from the quantificational force of the assertion of the determiner. And indeed, some -which has an "existential" assertion as in (20), repeated below -seems to have an "existential" second argument presupposition.
a. some
Indeed, when one student has younger siblings, (47a) could be intuitively true while (47b) is intuitively false (rather than a presupposition failure). This
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Yael Sharvit is further supported by the coherence of (48), confirming that some is not 'SUE st ⇒ ' on its second argument.
(48) Some student likes her mother, but not all students have a mother.
On the other hand, since it seems that every has a "universal" assertion and a "universal" second argument presupposition, it may very well be SUE st ⇒ on its second argument. It is worth noting that if some had a "universal" second argument presupposition, it would still be UE ⇛ on its second argument, but merely SUE ⇛ on its first argument.
Finally, no determiner that we are aware of is either UE 
4.2.3
Step 3: Constraining P and Q with ⇢ None of the definitions of the determiner properties we have discussed relies on '⇒'. What, then, is its status? As already mentioned in Section 4.1, '⇒' doesn't even apply to ⟨French student, student⟩, because there might be individuals that cannot be a student or be French in principle. We also noted that '⇒' is applicable in all possible worlds only to some world-independent ⟨e, t⟩ pairs (e.g., ⟨be John, be self-identical⟩). Importantly, '⇛' is applicable to those pairs as well, so there is no need to use '⇒' in any of the definitions of DE ⇛ , UE ⇛ , SDE ⇛ or SUE ⇛ . But we can and should make more subtle distinctions. For example, we want to distinguish between ⟨French student, student⟩ and ⟨likes his mother, likes someone⟩. '⇛' is applicable to both of them in all possible worlds, but they do differ from each other: in the first pair, both members have the same presuppositions (it seems that being able to be a French student, in principle, and being able to be a student, in principle, amount to the same set of requirements, whatever they are). To capture this, we define '⇢', which is applicable to ⟨French student, student⟩ but not to ⟨likes his mother, likes someone⟩.
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(49)
if f , g ∈ D ⟨σ ,τ⟩ , then f ⇢ g if for all x ∈ Dom(f ) ∩ Dom(g), f (x) ⇢ g(x), and Dom(f ) = Dom(g)
The contrast below suggests that '⇢' is indeed linguistically significant: (50a) does not intuitively entail (50b), it merely intuitively Strawson-entails it (because (50a) may be intuitively true while the students have no first book), but (51a) does intuitively entail (51b). 
A function f ∈ D ⟨σ ,τ⟩ is DE ⇢ iff for any P , Q ∈ D σ such that P ⇢ Q and f (Q) is defined: f (P ) is defined and f (Q) ⇛ f (P ).
Classical entailment doesn't seem to be linguistically significant. It doesn't seem that any linguistically significant property of determiners is defined exclusively in terms of '⇒'. We are now in a position to solve the P -to-Q problem. Let us weaken the first argument presupposition of some in (20a) to C(w) ∩ Dom(Z) ≠ ∅. Some is still UE ⇛ on its first and second arguments; moreover, (53a)- (53b) (ii) For any C and w, β C,w ⇢ α C,w .
Alternative solutions
To recap, ignoring the P -to-Q problem, we solved the second argument projection problem in Section 3 by classifying determiners that are intuitively upward-entailing on their first argument as SUE ST on their first argument, as this term is defined in (33), repeated below (a similar move takes care of determiners that are intuitively downward-entailing on their first argument).
A function f ∈ D ⟨σ ,τ⟩ is SUE ST iff for any P , Q ∈ D σ such that P ⇒ Q and f (P ) and f (Q) are defined: f (P ) st ⇒ f (Q).
1:30
A note on (Strawson) entailment To also solve the P -to-Q problem, in Section 4 we disowned '⇒' and replaced it with '⇛', itself defined in terms of ' st ⇒' (see the valid (53) and (54) Unlike some C,w , F C,w some applies to its two arguments at the same time, so the second argument projection problem does not arise, and by (55), some C,w 
